We consider group identification models in which the aggregation of individual opinions concerning who is qualified in a given society determines the set of socially qualified persons. In this setting, we study the extent to which social qualification can be changed when societies expand, shrink, or partition themselves. The answers we provide are with respect to the computational complexity of the corresponding control problems and fully cover the class of consent aggregation rules introduced by Samet and Schmeidler (J Econ Theory, 110(2):213-233, 2003) as well as procedural rules for group identification. We obtain both polynomial-time solvability results and NP-hardness results. In addition, we also study these problems from the parameterized complexity perspective, and obtain some fixed-parameter tractability results.
Introduction
Group decision making plays an important role in multi-agent systems. Imagine for instance a set N of agents who have to determine those among them who are eligible or qualified to complete a task. In such a case the view of all agents has to be taken into account and a rule for the selection of a subset of N should be specified. In this paper we consider a specific decision-making model in which each individual qualifies or disqualifies every In the table, "NP-h" stands for "NP-hard", "P" stands for "polynomial-time solvable", and "I" stands for "immune". The NP-hardness results with the symbol "+" next to them mean that the problems are fixedparameter tractable (FPT) with respect to |S|, where S is the set of individuals the strategic agent wants to make socially qualified individual in N , and then a social rule is applied to select the socially qualified individuals. This model has been widely studied under the name group identification in economics (see [8] for a survey). In particular, the class of consent rules, the consensus-start-respecting rule (CSR), and the liberal-start-respecting rule (LSR) have been axiomatically characterized in the literature [9, 23, 25, 32, 34] . Each rule in the class of consent social rules is characterized by two positive integers s and t. Specifically, if an individual qualifies herself, then this individual is socially qualified if and only if there are at least s − 1 other individuals who also qualify her. On the other hand, if the individual disqualifies herself, then this individual is not socially qualified if and only if there are at least t − 1 other individuals who also disqualify her. The CSR and the LSR social rules iteratively determine the socially qualified individuals. In the beginning, the set K L of individuals each of whom qualifies herself are considered LSR socially qualified, while the set K C of individuals each of whom is qualified by all individuals are considered CSR socially qualified. Then, in each iteration for the social rule LSR (resp. CSR), an individual a is added to K L (resp. K C ) if there is an individual in K L (resp. K C ) qualifying a. The iteration terminates when no new individual can be added to K L (resp. K C ), and the socially qualified individuals are the ones in K L (resp. K C ). The two rules CSR and LSR are referred to as procedural rules in the literature. In this paper, we consider the problems where an external (strategic) agent has an incentive to control the results by either adding some individuals (GCAI), or deleting some individuals (GCDI), or partitioning the set of individuals (GCPI). In particular, in each problem the external agent has a subset S of individuals and the goal of the external agent is to make all individuals in S socially qualified (see Sect. 2.2 for the precise definitions of GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI). We study the complexity of these problems for the class of consent rules and the two procedural rules CSR and LSR. We achieve both polynomial-time solvability results and NP-hardness results for these problems. In particular, we obtain dichotomy results for all problems considered in this paper for consent rules, with respect to the values of s and t. In addition, we study the NP-hard problems from the parameterized complexity point of view, and obtain several fixed-parameter tractability results, with respect to |S|. See Table 1 for a summary of our main findings.
To the best of our knowledge, group identification as a classic model for identifying socially qualified individuals has not been studied from the complexity point of view. 1 The words "control by adding/deleting/partitioning of" in the names of the group identification control problems are reminiscent of many strategic voting problems, such as control by adding/deleting/partitioning of voters/candidates, which have been extensively studied in the literature [2, 15, 16, 31, 36, 37] . In a voting system, we have a set of candidates and a set of voters. Each voter casts a vote, and a voting correspondence is used to select a subset of candidates. From this standpoint, group identification can be considered as a voting system where the individuals are both voters and candidates. Nevertheless, group identification differs from voting systems in many significant aspects. First, the goal of a voting system is to select a subset of candidates, who are often called winners since they are considered as more competitive or outstanding compared with the remaining candidates for some specific purpose. Despite that the goal of group identification is also to identify a set of individuals (socially qualified individuals) from the entire set of individuals, it does not imply that socially qualified individuals are more competitive or outstanding than the remaining individuals. For instance, in situations where we want to identify left-wing party members among a group of people, the model of group identification is more suitable. In other words, group identification is closer to a classification model. Second, as voting systems aim to select a subset of competitive candidates for some special purpose, more often than not, the number of winners is pre-decided (e.g., in a single-winner voting, exactly one candidate is selected as the winner). As a consequence, many voting systems need to adopt a certain tie-breaking method to break the tie when many candidates are considered equally competitive. However, group identification does not need a tie-breaking method, since there is no bound on the number of socially qualified individuals.
It is also worth pointing out that the classic voting system Approval, which has been widely studied in the literature [3, 18, 22, 28, 30, 38] , has the flavor of group identification. In Approval voting, each voter approves or disapproves each candidate. Thus, each voter's vote is represented by a 1-0 vector, where the entries with 1s (resp. 0s) mean that the voter approves (resp. disapproves) the corresponding candidate. The winners are among the candidates which get the most approvals. If the voters and candidates are the same group of individuals, then it seems that Approval voting is a social rule. Nevertheless, as discussed above, Approval voting is more often considered as a single-winner voting system and thus needs to utilize a tie-breaking method. Recently, several variants of Approval voting have been studied as multi-winner voting systems. However, the number of winners is bounded by (or exactly equal to) an integer (see, e.g., [1, 27] ). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, complexity of control by adding/deleting/partitioning of voters/candidates has not been studied for Approval voting when the voters and candidates coincide.
Recently, multiwinner voting where the number of winners is not fixed has also been studied (see, e.g., [4, 17, 26, 39] ). However, these rules are completely different from what we study in the paper. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, to date only the very recent papers [17] and [39] (which appeared after the workshop version of our paper) considered such multiwinner voting from the complexity point of view. However, they mainly considered the winner determination problem while we consider control problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we formally introduce the studied social rules, the studied group control problems, as well as the NP-hard problems we make use of in our proofs. Section 3 is then devoted to the study of the control problems when the corresponding aggregation rule is a consent rule, while in Sect. 4 we study these problems with respect to the procedural rules. We assume then in Sect. 5 that the size of the group of individuals to be made socially qualified is bounded and study the fixed-parameter tractability of the group control problems. We conclude our work and offer some directions for future research in Sect. 6.
Basic notation and definitions
Throughout this paper we will need the following basic notions and concepts.
Social rules
Let N be a set of individuals. We assume that each individual a ∈ N has an opinion about who from the set N possesses a certain qualification and who does not. For a ∈ N , we write ϕ(a, a ) = 1 to denote the fact that a qualifies a , and ϕ(a, a ) = 0 to denote the fact that a disqualifies a . The mapping ϕ : N × N → {0, 1} is called a profile over N . A social rule is a function f assigning a subset f (ϕ, T ) ⊆ T to each pair (ϕ, T ) consisting of a profile ϕ over N and a subset T ⊆ N . We call the individuals in f (ϕ, T ) the socially qualified individuals of T with respect to f and ϕ.
In what follows we focus our analysis on the class of consent rules introduced by Samet and Schmeidler [34] and on the procedural rules for group identification axiomatically studied in [9] .
Consent rules f (s,t)
Each consent rule f (s,t) is specified by two positive integers s and t such that for every T ⊆ N and every individual a ∈ T ,
Notice that if an individual qualifies (disqualifies) herself but lacks the qualification (disqualification) of at least s − 1 (t − 1) other individuals, then she will be socially disqualified/qualified. The two positive integers s and t are referred to as the consent quotas of the rule f (s,t) . It is worth mentioning that in the original definition of consent rules by Samet and Schmeidler [34] there is an additional condition s + t ≤ n + 2 for consent quotas s and t to satisfy, where n is the number of individuals (see [34] for further details). Indeed, the condition s + t ≤ n + 2 is crucial for the consent rules to satisfy the monotonicity property requiring a socially qualified individual a to be still socially qualified when someone who disqualifies a turns to qualify a. Since our paper is mainly concerned with the computational complexity of group control problems, we drop this condition from the definition of the consent rules (we indeed achieve results for a more general class of social rules that encapsulates the original consent rules defined in the work of Samet and Schmeidler [34] ). When studying the group control problems for the consent rules f (s,t) we assume that the consent quotas s and t remain the same, i.e., they do not change after adding new individuals, deleting old ones, or partitioning the set of individuals. Finally, we would like to point out that the consent rule f (1,1) is also referred to as the liberal rule in the literature [34] .
Consensus-start-respecting rule f CSR For every T ⊆ N , this rule determines the socially qualified individuals iteratively. First, all individuals who are qualified by everyone in the society are considered socially qualified. Then, in each iteration, all individuals who are qualified by at least one of the currently socially qualified individuals are added to the set of socially qualified individuals. The iterations terminate when no new individual is added. Formally, for every T ⊆ N , let
For each positive integer = 1, 2, …, let 
Group control
Let us now formally state the three group control problems we study. In the following, let f be a social rule.
Group Control by Adding Individuals (GCAI)

Input:
A 5-tuple (N , ϕ, S, T, k) of a set N of individuals, a profile ϕ over N , two nonempty subsets S, T ⊆ N such that S ⊆ T and S f (ϕ, T ), and a positive integer k.
Question:
Is there a subset
Group Control by Deleting Individuals (GCDI)
Input:
A 4-tuple (N , ϕ, S, k) of a set N of individuals, a profile ϕ over N , a nonempty subset S ⊆ N such that S f (ϕ, N ), and a positive integer k.
Question:
Is there a subset U ⊆ N \S such that |U | ≤ k and S ⊆ f (ϕ, N \U )?
Group Control by Partitioning of Individuals (GCPI)
Input:
A 3-tuple (N , ϕ, S) of a set N of individuals, a profile ϕ over N , and a nonempty subset
As discussed in Sect. 1, each of the above three problems models a scenario where there is an initial group of individuals (i.e., the set T in GCAI and the set N in GCDI and GCPI), and an external agent attempts to make a specific subset of individuals in the initial group socially qualified by carrying out the corresponding operations (i.e., adding individuals in GCAI, deleting individuals in GCDI, or partitioning the set of individuals in GCPI). We say that a social rule is immune to a control type if it is impossible to make a socially disqualified individual in the initial group socially qualified by carrying out the corresponding operations. Equivalently, a social rule is immune to a control type if and only if the corresponding group control problem for this rule has only NO-instances. If a social rule is not immune to a control type involved in a problem defined above, we say it is susceptible to the control type.
Some NP-hard problems
Our NP-hardness results in this paper are shown by efficient reductions from the following NP-hard problems: a restricted version of Exact Cover by Three-Sets (RX3C), Labeled Red-Blue Dominating Set (LRBDS), and 3-Satisfiability (3-SAT). The formal definitions of these problems are as follows.
Restricted version of Exact Cover by Three-Sets (RX3C)
Input:
A finite set X with |X | = 3κ for some positive integer κ and a collection C of 3-subsets (sets of cardinality 3) of X such that every x ∈ X occurs in exactly three 3-subsets in C. So, it holds that |C| = 3κ.
Question:
Is there a subcollection C ⊆ C such that |C | = κ and each x ∈ X appears in exactly one set of C ?
The NP-hardness of RX3C is shown in [21] (Theorem A.1). In order to state the second NP-hard problem, we will need the following basic notions from graph theory. We consider only undirected graphs. A graph is a tuple (W, E) where W is the vertex set and E is the edge set. A vertex v dominates a vertex u if there is an edge between v and u. A vertex subset A dominates another vertex subset B, if for every vertex u ∈ B there is some vertex v ∈ A that dominates u. An independent set I of a graph is a vertex subset such that there is no edge between each pair of vertices in I . A bipartite graph is a graph whose vertex set can be partitioned into two independent sets. We denote by (L R, E) a bipartite graph with (L , R) being a partition of its vertex set such that both L and R are independent sets. We refer to the textbook of West [35] for further details on graphs.
We can now state the second NP-hard problem we will use in the next sections.
Labeled Red-Blue Dominating Set (LRBDS)
Input:
A bipartite graph G = (R B, E), where each vertex in R has a label from {1, 2, . . . , k}. For every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, let R i be the set of all vertices in R that have label i.
Question:
The following additional notions will be needed as to state the third NP-hard problem mentioned above. A Boolean variable x takes either the value 1 or 0. Let X be a set of Boolean variables. If x ∈ X , then x andx are literals over X . A clause c over X is a set of literals over X . A truth assignment is a function : X → {0, 1}. A clause c is satisfied under a truth assignment if and only if there is an x in c such that (x) = 1, or ax in c such that (x) = 0. The 3-Satisfiability problem defined below is a famous NP-hard problem [6, 20] .
3-Satisfiability (3-SAT)
Input:
A set X of Boolean variables, and a collection C of clauses over X such that each clause includes exactly three literals.
Question:
Is there a truth assignment : X → {0, 1} under which all clauses in C are satisfied?
Consent rules
We start our analysis by investigating the group control problems with respect to consent rules. Section 3.1 describes the subclass of rules that turn out to be immune to (some of) these control types. In Sects. 3.2 and 3.3 we then explore the computational complexity of group control problems for consent rules that are susceptible to the corresponding control types.
Immune consent rules
The intrinsic property of the consent rule f (1,1) is that it completely leaves to each individual to determine her own social qualification. Put it another way, whether an individual is socially qualified is independent of the opinions of any other individual. As a consequence, the answers to the question whether an individual is socially qualified before and after the operations in the corresponding group control problems are the same, as implied by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The consent rule f (1,1) is immune to GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI.
Proof Assume that there is an individual a which is not socially qualified initially. Due to the definition of f (1,1) , ϕ(a, a) = 0. It is easy to verify that a / ∈ f (1,1) (ϕ, V ) for every V ⊆ N such that a ∈ V . This directly means that a cannot be made socially qualified via adding/deleting/partitioning individuals.
Let us now turn to consent rules f (s,1) and f (1,t) with s, t ≥ 2. In order to change the social status of an individual a from disqualified to qualified when f (s,1) is applied, one needs the number of supporters of a to increase, but neither deleting individuals nor partitioning the set of individuals create additional support. On the other hand, when the applied rule is f (1,t) , the number of individuals who disqualify a does not decrease when adding individuals. Our next result confirms this intuition with respect to the corresponding control types.
Theorem 2 Every consent rule f (s,1) with s ≥ 2 is immune to GCDI and GCPI, and every consent rule f (1,t) with t ≥ 2 is immune to GCAI.
Proof We first prove the immunity of consent rules f (s,1) with s ≥ 2 to GCDI and GCPI. Let a be an individual who is not socially qualified, i.e., a / ∈ f (s,1) (ϕ, N ). We distinguish between two cases.
Case ϕ(a, a) = 1. There are at most s − 1 individuals in N qualifying the individual a, i.e.,
Therefore, it is impossible to make the individual a socially qualified by deleting or partitioning the set of individuals. Case ϕ(a, a) = 0. It is easy to verify that for every V ⊆ N such that a ∈ V , it holds that
Now we give the proof for the immunity of the consent rule f (1,t) , t ≥ 2, to GCAI. Let a ∈ T be an individual in the initial group which is not socially qualified, i.e., a / ∈ f (1,t) (ϕ, T ). This implies that ϕ(a, a) = 0 and, moreover, there are at least t individuals a (including a) in T such that ϕ(a , a) = 0. Therefore, no matter which individuals the set U includes, there will be still at least t individuals a ∈ T ∪ U such that ϕ(a , a) = 0, implying that a is still not socially qualified.
In the remaining subsections we show how the interplay between the consent quotas s and t shapes the extent to which the corresponding consent rules are susceptible to all the three group control types.
Polynomial-time solvability
We start with GCDI for consent rules f (s,2) with s ≥ 1. In order to show that every such rule is not immune to this group control type, we need only to give an instance where one can make all individuals in S socially qualified by deleting a limited number of individuals, given that not all individuals in S are socially qualified in advance. To this end, consider an instance (N = {a, b}, ϕ, S = {a}, k = 1) where ϕ(a, a) = ϕ(b, a) = 0. It is clear that one can make a socially qualified by deleting b from the instance. As our next result reveals, it is practically tractable for a designer to control a group identification procedure by deleting individuals, provided that the social rule is f (s,2) .
Theorem 3 GCDI for every consent rule f (s,2) with s
For each a ∈L, let U a ⊆ N be the set of individuals each of whom is outside S and disqualifies a, i.e., U a = {a ∈ N \S | ϕ(a , a) = 0}. Moreover, let U = a∈L U a . We develop a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem stated in the theorem as follows: it returns "NO" if S f (s,2) (ϕ, N \U ) or |U | > k, and otherwise returns "YES". The correctness of the algorithm is shown based on the following observations. According to the consent rule f (s,2) , a ∈L is socially qualified if there is no individual a = a such that ϕ(a , a) = 0. Therefore, in order to make a ∈L socially qualified, all individuals a ∈ N \S with ϕ(a , a) = 0 have to be deleted. This directly implies that all individuals in U , as defined above, have to be deleted. Now let us consider
We distinguish between the following two cases.
Case a ∈ L. According to the consent rule f (s,2) , there are at most s − 1 individuals a ∈ N \U such that ϕ(a , a) = 1. Since deleting individuals does not increase the number of individuals who qualify a, the individual a cannot be socially qualified after deleting some further individuals. Thus, the given instance is a NO-instance. Case a ∈L. In this case, there is an individual a ∈ S\{a} such that ϕ(a , a) = 0. Since we cannot delete individuals in S due to the definition of the problem, individual a cannot be socially qualified. Thus, the given instance is a NO-instance.
Due to the above analysis, if S f (s,2) (ϕ, N \U ), we can safely return "NO". Since we are allowed to delete at most k individuals, and according to the above analysis all individuals in U must be deleted, if |U | > k, we can safely return "NO" too. On the other hand, if S ⊆ f (s,2) (ϕ, N \U ) and |U | ≤ k, U itself is an evidence for answering "YES".
Finally, observe that the construction of the set U , and the decisions of whether S ⊆ f (s,2) (ϕ, N \U ) and |U | ≤ k can be done in O(|N | 2 ) time. This completes the proof.
NP-hardness
In contrast to the polynomial-time solvability of GCDI for consent rules f (s,2) with s ≥ 1, we prove in this section that the same problem for consent rules with quotas s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 3 becomes NP-hard. Theorem 4 additionally shows that GCAI for consent rules with quotas s ≥ 2 and t ≥ 1 is NP-hard, too. It should be also noted that the instances in our NP-hardness reductions directly imply that every consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 2 and t ≥ 1 is susceptible to GCAI, and every consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 3 is susceptible to GCDI.
Theorem 4 GCAI for every consent rule f (s,t)
with s ≥ 2 and t ≥ 1, and GCDI for every consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 3 are NP-hard.
Proof We prove the theorem by reductions from the RX3C problem. Let us first consider GCAI for consent rules f (2,t) with t ≥ 1. Given an instance I = (X, C) of RX3C with |X | = 3κ, we create an instance E I = (N , ϕ, S, T, k) of GCAI for f (s,t) as follows.
There are |X |+|C| individuals in N = {a x | x ∈ X }∪{a c | c ∈ C}. The first |X | individuals {a x | x ∈ X } one-to-one correspond to the elements in X , and the last |C| individuals {a c | c ∈ C} one-to-one correspond to elements in C. We define S = T = {a x ∈ N | x ∈ X }. In addition, we set k = κ. Now we define the profile ϕ.
For each x ∈ X and for each
For the proof, the values of ϕ(a x , a c ) where x ∈ X and c ∈ C are not essential. Obviously, the construction of E I can be done in polynomial time.
Now we prove the correctness of the reduction, i.e., we show that I is a YES-instance of RX3C if and only if E I is a YES-instance of GCAI.
(⇒:) Suppose I is a YES-instance of RX3C, and let C ⊆ C be an exact 3-set cover, i.e., |C | = κ and for every x ∈ X there exists a c ∈ C such that x ∈ c. Let U = {a c ∈ N | c ∈ C }. Then, according to the definition of ϕ, for each a x ∈ S, there exists an a c ∈ U such that ϕ(a c , a x ) = 1. Moreover, each a x ∈ S qualifies herself (i.e., ϕ(a x , a x ) = 1). Therefore, according to the definition of the consent rule f (2,t) , a x ∈ f (2,t) 
(⇐:) Suppose that E I is a YES-instance of GCAI, and let U ⊆ N \T be a set of individuals such that |U | ≤ k = κ and S ⊆ f (2,t) 
and for all a x , a x ∈ S = T , ϕ(a x , a x ) = 1 if and only if x = x , it follows that, for each a x ∈ S, there is an a c ∈ U such that ϕ(a c , a x ) = 1. Then, according to the definition of the profile ϕ, for each x ∈ X , there exists c ∈ C such that a c ∈ U and x ∈ c. This implies that C = {c ∈ C | a c ∈ U } is an exact 3-set cover of I. Thus, I is a YES-instance.
The NP-hardness reduction for GCAI for any consent rule f (s,t) with s > 2 and t ≥ 1 can be adapted from the above reduction. Precisely, we introduce further s −2 dummy individuals in T , and let all these dummy individuals qualify every individual in S = {a x ∈ N | x ∈ X }. The opinions of a dummy individual over any other individual in N and the other way around do not matter in the proof, and thus can be set arbitrarily. Now for each individual a x ∈ S, there are exactly s − 1 individuals in T who qualify a x . Moreover, in order to make each a x ∈ S socially qualified, we need one more individual in N \T who qualifies a x . Now let us consider GCDI for consent rules f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 3. We first consider the case t = 3. The reduction for this problem is similar to the above reduction for GCAI for consent rules f (2,t) with t ≥ 1 with the following differences.
1. There is no T in this reduction; but keeping S = {a x ∈ N | x ∈ X }. (⇒:) Suppose that there is an exact 3-set cover C ⊂ C for I, i.e., |C | = κ and for every x ∈ X there exists exactly one c ∈ C such that x ∈ c. Let U = {a c | c ∈ C\C } and U = {a c | c ∈ C }. Clearly, S ∩ U = ∅. Moreover, N \U = S ∪ U . Let a x be an individual in S where x ∈ X . Then, according to the construction, there is exactly one a c ∈ U such that ϕ(a c , a x ) = 0. Since ϕ(a x , a x ) = 1 for all a x ∈ S\{a x }, according to the consent rule f (s,3) , a x ∈ f (s,3) (ϕ, N \U ). Since this holds for every a x ∈ S, we can conclude that S ⊆ f (s,3) (ϕ, N \U ).
(⇐:) Suppose that there is a subset U ⊆ N \S such that |U | ≤ 2κ and
Let U = N \(S ∪ U ) and C = {c ∈ C | a c ∈ U }. Thus, N \U = S ∪ U . Due to the fact that ϕ(a x , a x ) = 0 for every a x ∈ S where x ∈ X and the definition of ϕ, it holds that for every a x ∈ S, there is at most one a c ∈ U such that ϕ(a c , a x ) = 0 and x ∈ c.
Due to the construction, every individual a c ∈ U disqualifies exactly three individuals in S. Then, from |S| = 3κ it follows that |U | ≤ κ. In addition, from |U | ≤ 2κ, we obtain that |U | = 3κ − |U | ≥ κ. Hence, it must be that |U | = k. It follows that every individual a x where x ∈ X is disqualified by exactly one individual a c ∈ U such that c ∈ C and x ∈ c. This implies that the subcollection C corresponding to U is an exact 3-set cover of I. The proof of NP-hardness of the problem for any consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and t > 3 can be adapted from the above reduction by introducing some dummy individuals. In particular, we introduce further t − 3 individuals in S. Let S denote the set of the t − 3 dummy individuals. Thus, S = {a x ∈ N | x ∈ X } ∪ S . We want each dummy individual in S to be a robust socially qualified individual, i.e., every d ∈ S is socially qualified regardless of which individuals (at most k = 2κ) would be deleted. To this end, for every d ∈ S , we let d disqualify herself, and let all the other individuals qualify d. We set ϕ(d, a x ) = 0 for every d ∈ S and a x where x ∈ X . Thus, for every a x ∈ S where x ∈ X , there are in total t + 1 individuals in N who disqualify a x . The other entries in the profile not defined above can be set arbitrarily. In order to make each a x ∈ S where x ∈ X socially qualified, we need to delete exactly two individuals in N \S who disqualify a x . This happens if and only if there is an exact 3-set cover for I, as we discussed in the proof for the consent rule f (s,3) .
Even though consent rules f (s,t) with s ≥ 2 (resp. f (s,t) with t ≥ 3) are susceptible to GCAI (resp. GCDI), Theorem 4 reveals that it is a computationally hard task for a designer to successfully control a group identification procedure in these cases by adding (resp. deleting) individuals.
Let us now turn to the GCPI problem. We have shown in Theorems 1 and 2 that every consent rule f (s,1) with s ≥ 1 is immune to this control type. In order to show that consent rules with t ≥ 2 are susceptible to GCPI, consider an instance (N , ϕ, S) , where N = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t+1 } and ϕ(a i , a j ) = 0 for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t + 1}, i.e., everyone disqualifies everyone, and S = {a 1 }. Clearly, no individual is socially qualified, i.e., f (s,t) (ϕ, N ) = ∅. Consider now the partition (U = {a 1 }, N \{a 1 }) of N and note that f (s,t) (ϕ, U ) = S. Moreover, for every individual a i ∈ N \U , at least t individuals in N \U disqualify a i and thus f (s,t) (ϕ, N \U ) = ∅. We have then S = {a
, showing the susceptibility of the consent rule to GCPI. Our next result reveals that, in fact, manipulation by partitioning the set of individuals is NP-hard, provided that the social rule is f (s,t) with t ≥ 2.
Theorem 5 GCPI for every consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 2 is NP-hard.
Proof We prove the NP-hardness of the problem stated in the theorem by a reduction from the 3-SAT problem. We first consider GCPI for consent rules f (s,2) with s ≥ 1. Later, we extend the reduction to all consent rules f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 3.
Let (X, C) be an instance of the 3-SAT problem, where X is the set of Boolean variables and C is the set of clauses each consisting of three literals. Moreover, let m and n be the numbers of the variables and clauses, respectively, i.e., m = |X | and n = |C|. We construct an instance E = (N , ϕ, S) of GCPI for f (s,2) as follows.
There are in total 2m + n + 1 individuals in N . In particular, for each variable x ∈ X , we create two individuals a(x, 1) and a(x, 2), and for each clause c ∈ C, we create an individual a(c). Moreover, we create one individual a(C) for C. We set S = {a(x, 1) | x ∈ X } ∪ {a(C)} and define the profile ϕ as follows. Table 2 is helpful for the reader to check the following arguments.
For each
a ∈ N , ϕ(a, a) = 0. 2. For each x ∈ X , ϕ(a(x, 2), a(x, 1)) = 0.a(x, 1) N \{a(x, 1), a(x, 2)} a(x, 1), a(x, 2) a(x, 2) N \({a(x, 2), a(C)} ∪ {a(c) | c ∈ C}) a(x, 2),
Now we prove that (X, C) is a YES-instance if and only if E is a YES-instance.
(⇒:) Assume that there is a truth assignment : X → {0, 1}. Then, we find a U ⊆ N as follows. First, in U we include the individual a(C) and exclude all individuals in {a(c) | c ∈ C}, i.e., a(C) ∈ U and {a(c) | c ∈ C} ⊆ N \U . In addition, for each x ∈ X , U includes exactly one of {a(x, 1), a(x, 2)}, depending on the value of (x). In particular, for every x ∈ X , a(x, 1) ∈ U and a(x, 2) ∈ N \U if (x) = 1; and a(x, 2) ∈ U and a(x, 1) ∈ N \U ; otherwise. Now we consider the subprofiles f (s,2) 
(ϕ, U ) and f (s,2) (ϕ, N \U ). Since the only individual in U who disqualifies a(C) is a(C) herself, it holds that a(C) ∈ f (s,2) (ϕ, U )
. Let x be any variable in X . Due to the above definition of U , the individuals a(x, 2) and a(x, 1) are not included in the same element of the partition (U, N \U ) of N . Since the only individuals who disqualify a(x, 1) are a(x, 1) and a(x, 2), it holds that a(x, 1) survives the first stage of selection, i.e., a(x,
On the other hand, since a(C) and all individuals in {a(c) | c ∈ C} disqualify every individual in {a(x, 2) | x ∈ X }, none of {a(x, 2) | x ∈ X } survives the first stage of selection, i.e., for every x ∈ X it holds that a(x, 2) / ∈ f (s,2) (ϕ, W ) where W ∈ {U, N \U } and a(x, 2) ∈ W . Now we consider the individuals corresponding to the clauses. Let c ∈ C be a clause. Since c is satisfied under , there is either an x ∈ c such that (x) = 1, or ax ∈ c such that (x) = 0. In the former case, we have a(x, 2) ∈ N \U , ϕ(a(x, 2), a(c)) = 0, and in the latter case we have a(x, 1) ∈ N \U , ϕ(a(x, 1), a(c)) = 0. Hence, both cases lead a(c) to be eliminated in the first stage of selection, i.e.,
As a summary, f (s,2) (ϕ, U ) ∪ f (s,2) (ϕ, N \U ) = S. Since every individual in S is only disqualified by herself in the profile restricted to S, i.e., ϕ(a , a) = 0 if and only if a = a for every a, a ∈ S, we have that S = f (s,2) (ϕ, S). This completes the proof of this direction.
(⇐:) Suppose that there exists a subset U ⊆ N such that
Due to symmetry, assume that a(C) ∈ U . Since for every c ∈ C, ϕ(a(c), a(C)) = 0, and a(C) ∈ S, it holds that {a(c) | c ∈ C} ⊆ N \U (otherwise, a(C) would be eliminated in the subprofile restricted to U ). Moreover, it holds that
As a result, for every a(c), except herself, there must be at least one other individual in N \U who disqualifies a(c). Due to the definition of the profile, this means that there is either an x ∈ c such that a(x, 2) ∈ N \U , or ax ∈ c such that a(x, 1) ∈ N \U . Since for every x ∈ X it holds that
exactly one of {a(x, 1), a(x, 2)} can be in N \U (otherwise, a(x, 1) would be eliminated in the first stage of selection). Hence, given U , we can uniquely define a truth assignment as follows. For every x ∈ X , define (x) = 1 if a(x, 2) ∈ N \U and a(x) = 0 otherwise. Then, due to the above discussion, for every c ∈ C, there is either an x ∈ c such that (x) = 1 or ā x ∈ c such that (x) = 0. Therefore, every clause is satisfied under the truth assignment . This completes the proof of this direction. Now, we explain how to extend the above reduction for each consent rule f (s,t) with t ≥ 3. Assume that |C| ≥ t − 1 (if this is not the case, we can duplicate any arbitrary clause to make the inequality hold). In addition to the individuals defined in the above reduction, we further create 2t − 4 dummy individuals a 1 1 , . . . , a 2 }. So we now have S = {a(x, 1) | x ∈ X } ∪ a(C) ∪ A 1 , and Observe that, by defining so, to make all individuals in A 1 socially qualified, it has to be the case that for every solution U the number of dummy individuals included in U and N \U should be the same (and equal to t − 2). Assume for the sake of contradiction that this is not the case. Let U ⊆ N be a solution. Due to symmetry, we assume that |U ∩(A 1 ∪ A 2 )| ≥ t −1. Apparently, U includes at least one individual a i 1 ∈ S∩ A 1 . Moreover, all individuals in {a(x, 1) | x ∈ X }∪{a(C)}, all of which are in S, must be partitioned into the set N \U , since otherwise all of them will be eliminated in the first stage of selection (i.e., for every a ∈ {a(x, 1) | x ∈ X } ∪ {a(C)} it holds that a / ∈ f (s,t) (ϕ, W ) where W ∈ {U, N \U } and a ∈ W ). As a result, at most t − 2 individuals in {a(c) | c ∈ C} can be included in N \U , since otherwise the individual a(C) will be eliminated, i.e., a(C) / ∈ f (s,t) (ϕ, N \U ). As |C| ≥ t − 1, there will be at least one individual a(c) with c ∈ C in the set U . However, the individual a(c) together with all other individuals in U ∩ (A 1 ∪ A 2 ) will make a i 1 be eliminated, contradicting that U is a solution. The observation follows. The discussion for the observation also implies that for every solution U ⊆ N , either A 1 ⊆ U or A 1 ⊆ N \U , i.e., all individuals in A 1 must be included in the same element of the partition (U, N \U ) of N . Now, one can check that from every solution U of the instance constructed above for the consent rule f (s, 2) , we can get a solution for the instance constructed for the consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 3 by adding all individuals A 1 in U or N \U (if a(C) ∈ U then A 1 ⊆ U ; otherwise A 1 ⊆ N \U ), and vice versa. This completes the proof.
Every individual in
Procedural rules
In this section, we study group control problems with respect to the two procedural rules introduced in Sect. 2. We first show that GCAI for f LSR and GCAI for f CSR are both NPhard. The NP-hardness results also imply the susceptibility of the two procedural rules to GCAI.
Theorem 6 GCAI for f LSR and GCAI for f CSR are NP-hard.
Proof We prove the theorem by reductions from the RX3C problem. Let us first consider the social rule f LSR . Given an instance I = (X, C) of RX3C with |X | = 3κ, we create an instance E I = (N , ϕ, S, T, k) of GCAI for f LSR as follows. The definitions of N , S, T , and k are the same as in the NP-hardness reduction for GCAI for consent rules f (2,t) with t ≥ 1 in Theorem 4. Precisely, N = {a x | x ∈ X } ∪ {a c | c ∈ C} is a set of |X | + |C| individuals, with the first |X | individuals {a x | x ∈ X } one-to-one corresponding to the elements in X , and the last |C| individuals {a c | c ∈ C} one-to-one corresponding to elements in C. In addition, S = T = {a x ∈ N | x ∈ X }, and k = κ. The profile ϕ is defined as follows. Now we prove the correctness of the reduction. (⇒:) Suppose that there is an exact 3-set cover C ⊂ C for I, i.e., |C | = k and for every x ∈ X there exists exactly one c ∈ C such that x ∈ c. Let U = {a c | c ∈ C }. According to the definition of ϕ, it holds that U ⊆ f LSR (ϕ, T ∪ U ). Moreover, for every a x ∈ S with x ∈ X , there is an a c ∈ U such that ϕ(a c , a x ) = 1 and x ∈ c. Since U ⊆ f LSR (ϕ, T ∪ U ), according to the definition of the social rule f LSR , it holds that a x ∈ f LSR (ϕ, T ∪ U ) for every a x ∈ S. Therefore, E I is a YES-instance since it has a solution U .
For each
(⇐:) Suppose that there exists a subset U ⊆ N \T such that |U | ≤ k and
According to the definition of ϕ, it holds that f LSR (ϕ, T ) = ∅. Moreover, every a x ∈ S with x ∈ X disqualifies all individuals in N , and every a c ∈ N \T qualifies herself. As a result, for every a x ∈ S with x ∈ X , there must be at least one a c ∈ U with c ∈ C such that ϕ(a c , a x ) = 1. According to the definition of ϕ, this implies that for every x ∈ X , there is at least one c ∈ C such that x ∈ c. Since |C | = |U | ≤ k = κ, this implies that |C | = k and, more precisely, C is an exact 3-set cover of I. Now let us consider GCAI for f CSR . Again, the definitions of N , S, T , and k are the same as in the NP-hardness reduction for GCAI for consent rules f (2,t) with t ≥ 1 in Theorem 4. The profile ϕ is defined as follows. For each c, c ∈ C, ϕ(a c , a c ) = 1. 4. For each x ∈ X and each c ∈ C, ϕ(a c , a x ) = 1 if and only if x ∈ c. Now we prove the correctness of the reduction. (⇒:) Suppose that there is a C ⊂ C such that |C | = k and for every x ∈ X there exists exactly one c ∈ C such that x ∈ c.
Then, according to the definition of ϕ, it holds that for every a x ∈ S with x ∈ X , there is an a c ∈ U such that x ∈ c and ϕ(a c , a x ) = 1. This implies that a x ∈ f CSR (ϕ, T ∪ U ) for every a x ∈ S. Thus, E I is a YES-instance since it has a solution U .
According to the definition of ϕ, it holds that f CSR (ϕ, T ) = ∅. Moreover, every individual in S disqualifies every individual in S. Furthermore, every individual in N \T is qualified by all individuals in N . Therefore, for every a x ∈ S with x ∈ X , there must be at least one a c ∈ U such that ϕ(a c , a x ) = 1. According to the definition of ϕ, this implies that for every x ∈ X there is at least one c ∈ C such that x ∈ c. Since |C | = |U | ≤ k = κ, this implies that |C | = k and, more precisely, C is an exact 3-set cover of I.
In contrast to the susceptibility of the procedural rules to GCAI, we show next that f LSR turns out to be immune to the other two group control types. Intuitively, an individual is not socially qualified if there are not enough individuals qualifying her. Hence, deleting some individuals cannot make such an individual socially qualified; it in fact can only make the situation worse for the individual.
Theorem 7 The social rule f LSR is immune to GCDI and GCPI.
Proof According to the definition of f LSR , an individual a ∈ N is socially qualified with respect to f LSR if and only if there is a sequence of individuals a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t such that (1) a t = a; (2) ϕ(a 0 , a 0 ) = 1, i.e., a 0 is in the initial set of socially qualified individuals; and (3) ϕ(a i , a i+1 ) = 1 for every 0 ≤ i ≤ t − 1. Clearly, if there is no such path for an individual a, then after deleting some individuals such a path still does not exist for a. Hence, f LSR is immune to GCDI. Moreover, for any partition N 1 and N 2 of N such a path also does not exist in the subprofile restricted to both N 1 and N 2 , if it does not exist in the overall profile. Hence, f LSR is immune to GCPI too.
In contrast to the immunity of f LSR to GCDI and GCPI, we show that f CSR is susceptible to GCDI and GCPI. Consider the instance where there are three individuals a, b, c, and
Then, initially no one is qualified by all individuals. Hence, there are no socially qualified individuals. However, after deleting c both a and b become socially qualified individuals. In addition, if we partition the individuals as ({a, b}, {c}), both a and b become socially qualified individuals too. Next, we prove that GCDI for f CSR is polynomialtime solvable.
Theorem 8 GCDI for f CSR is polynomial time solvable.
Proof To prove the theorem, we develop a polynomial-time algorithm. For an individual a ∈ N , let D(a) be the set of individuals disqualifying a, i.e.,
The algorithm is as follows: return "YES" if and only if there is an individual a ∈ N such that |D(a)| ≤ k and S ⊆ f CSR (ϕ, N \D(a)). Clearly, the algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time. It remains to prove its correctness. Obviously, if the algorithm returns "YES", the given instance must be a YES-instance. We prove the opposite direction now. Suppose that the given instance is a YES-instance. Let U ⊆ N \S be a solution of the given instance, i.e., |U | ≤ k and S ⊆ f CSR (ϕ, N \U ). Let 
Bounded group size and parameterized complexity
We have shown in Theorems 4 and 5 that GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI for consent rules f (s,t) are NP-hard when either s or t exceeds some constant. Hence, there are no exact polynomial-time algorithms for these problems unless P=NP. In this section, we investigate how the size of the group S of individuals to be made socially qualified affects the complexity of the problems studied in the previous section. In particular, we study GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI from the parameterized complexity point of view, with respect to the size of S.
Parameterized complexity was introduced by Downey and Fellows [10] as a tool to deal with hard problems. A parameterized problem is a language contained in * × * , where is a finite alphabet. The first component is called the main part of the problem and the second component is called the parameter. In this paper, we consider only positive integer parameters. A parameterized problem is fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) if it is solvable in O( f (k) · |I | O(1) ) time, where I is the main part of the instance, k is the parameter, and f (k) is a computable function depending only on k. For further discussion on parameterized complexity, we refer to [7, 11, 33] .
We first study GCAI and GCDI for the consent rules. In particular, we prove that both GCAI and GCDI for these rules are FPT with respect to the size of S. To this end, we give integer linear programming (ILP) formulations with the number of variables bounded by 2 |S| for both problems. As ILP is FPT with respect to the number of variables [19, 24, 29] , so are GCAI and GCDI for the consent rules.
Lemma 1 [19, 24, 29] 
arithmetic operations, where L is the number of bits in the input and v is the number of variables in ILP.
Let us now describe the ILP formulations for GCAI and GCDI for consent rules. (s,t) are FPT with respect to the size of S.
Theorem 9 GCAI and GCDI for every consent rule f
Proof We prove the theorem by giving ILP formulations for the GCAI and GCDI problems. The number of variables in the formulations is bounded by a function of |S|. We first consider the GCAI problem.
Let (N , ϕ, S, T, k) be an instance of GCAI for f (s,t) . Let μ = |S|. We say two individuals a, b ∈ N have the same opinion over S, if for every c ∈ S, it holds that ϕ(a, c) = ϕ(b, c). Hereinafter, let (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) be any arbitrary but fixed order of N . a λ(1) ), ϕ(a i , a λ(2) ), . . . , ϕ(a i , a λ(μ) ) .
The ILP formulation for the instance is as follows. For every μ-dimensional 1-0 vector β, let N β = {a i ∈ N \T | ϕ (a i ,S) = β} and n β = |N β |. We create a variable x β for every μ-dimensional 1-0 vector β. Thus, there are in total 2 μ variables. Each variable x β indicates how many individuals from N β are included in the solution U . These variables are subject to the following restrictions. Let V be the set of all μ-dimensional 1-0 vectors.
(1) Since for every μ-dimensional 1-0 vector β there are at most n β individuals a i ∈ N \T such that ϕ (a i ,S) = β, we need to ensure that no more than n β of these individuals are in U . Moreover, every variable should be non-negative. Thus, every variable x β is subject to
(2) Since we can add at most k individuals in total, it has to be that
(3) In order to make every individual in S socially qualified, it has to be that
where β[i] is the i-th component of β. The inequality (3.1) is to ensure that for every a λ(i) ∈ S who qualifies herself there are at least s individuals in the final profile who qualify a λ(i) , and the inequality (3.2) is to ensure that for every individual a λ(i) ∈ S who disqualifies herself there are at most t − 1 individuals in the final profile who disqualify a λ(i) . Now let us consider the GCDI problem. Let (N , ϕ, S, k) be a given instance of GCDI for a consent rule f (s,t) . The ILP formulation for the instance is similar to the one for the GCAI problem discussed above. Let (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ), {a λ(1) , a λ(2) , . . . , a λ(μ) }, ϕ (a i ,S) , and V be defined with the same meanings as above. For every μ-dimensional 1-0 vector β, let N β = {a j ∈ N \S | ϕ (a j ,S) = β} and n β = |N β |. We create a variable y β for every β ∈ V. Each variable y β indicates how many individuals from N β are deleted. The restrictions are as follows.
(1) For every β ∈ V we can delete at most n β individuals in N β . Moreover, each variable should be non-negative. Thus, for every variable y β , we have that
(2) Since we can delete at most k individuals in total, we have that β∈V y β ≤ k.
According to Lemma 1, both ILPs shown above are solvable in time O(v 2.5v+o(v) · poly(v · n)), where v = 2 μ . As a result, both GCAI and GCDI are FPT with respect to μ = |S|.
Consider now GCPI for consent rules. In contrast to the fixed-parameter tractability of the GCAI and GCDI problems, we show that the GCPI problem is unlikely to admit an FPT-algorithm. In particular, we prove that GCPI for consent rules f (s,2) with s ≥ 3 remains NP-hard even when S is a singleton. This directly implies that GCPI for consent rules is not FPT. 2 Our reduction is from the LRBDS problem which is NP-hard as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The LRBDS problem is NP-hard.
The proof for the above lemma is deferred to the "Appendix". (s,2) where s ≥ 3 is NP-hard, even when |S| = 1.
Theorem 10 GCPI for consent rules f
Proof We prove the theorem by a reduction from the LRBDS problem. Let I = (G = (R B, E), {1, 2, . . . , k}) be an instance of the LRBDS problem. Let s ≥ 3. We create an instance E I = (N , ϕ, S) of GCPI for f (s,2) as follows. We create |R| + |B| + k + s − 2 individuals in total. Let (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R k ) be the partition of R with respect to the labels of the vertices. That is, R i where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, is the set of vertices in R with label i. For each vertex v ∈ R i where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we create an individual a i (v) . Let U ⊆ N be the set consisting of the individual w and all individuals that correspond to R\W . That is,
Since ϕ(w, w) = 0, and every individual corresponding to some vertex in R qualifies w (see 5) , it holds that w ∈ f (s,2) (ϕ, U ). Now, let us consider the profile restricted to N \U . Observe that 
Conclusion
We have studied the complexity of the group control by adding individuals (GCAI), group control by deleting individuals (GCDI), and group control by partitioning of individuals (GCPI) problems for the consent rules f (s,t) , the consensus-start-respecting rule f CSR , and the liberal-start-respecting rule f LSR , where in each problem an external agent has an incentive to make a given subset of individuals socially qualified by adding, or deleting a limited number of individuals, or by partitioning the set of individuals. In particular, as summarized in Table 1 , we achieved dichotomy results for all three group control problems for consent rules, with respect to the values of the consent quotas. In addition, we studied the NP-hard problems from the parameterized complexity point of view, with respect to the size of S, the set of individuals whom the external agent wants to make socially qualified. We proved that GCAI and GCDI for consent rules are generally FPT. In contrast, we showed that GCPI remains NP-hard for some consent rules even when |S| = 1, excluding the possibility that GCPI for consent rules is FPT, unless the W-hierarchy collapses. Table 1 shows that almost all social rules studied in this paper resist the three different control types, in the sense that either control problems for these rules are NP-hard or these rules are immune to the corresponding control types. Only GCDI for the consent rules f (s,2) and for f CSR are polynomial-time solvable. From the parameterized complexity point of view, GCAI and GCDI for consent rules are FPT while the procedural rule f LSR is immune to GCDI and GCPI. So, we can conclude that the procedural rule f LSR outperforms the consent rules and the f CSR rule in terms of resistance to control behavior. Note that whether GCAI for the two procedural rules is FPT with respect to |S| remains open. Moreover, whether GCPI for f CSR is NP-hard remains open.
Following the workshop version of this paper, there have been other papers which look at similar problems. In particular, Erdélyi, Reger, and Yang [13] extended our study to destructive control and constructive/destructive bribery problems in group identification. In addition, Erdélyi, Reger, and Yang [14] also considered possibly and necessarily socially qualified individuals problems in group identification. Nevertheless, there still remain many directions for future research. For instance, for consent rules, we assume that the consent quotas do not change. It would be quite natural to consider group control problems where s and t depend on the number of individuals, say, e.g., s is 30% and t is 35% of the number of individuals. In addition, it is interesting to investigate the complexity of group control problems in restricted domains of dichotomous preferences [12] . One can also study control and bribery problems in generalized group identification [5] where the aim is to classify the individuals into multiple groups instead of putting them into only two classes.
